Estonian MP and security expert Eerik-Niiles Kross says NATO’s rules of engagement explain why Russian fighters weren’t shot down – but argues Estonia still needs its own jets.
Russia’s violation of Estonia’s state border on 19 September was clearly unfriendly and deeply unsettling. I understand those who ask why the aircraft were not shot down. As a nation we cannot, and will not, tolerate aircraft from an aggressor state entering our airspace.
That said, the Russians managed to fly far more aggressively in the international and domestic media than they did in our skies – and that is regrettable. The coverage created the impression that Estonia was effortlessly penetrated while we stood by. In a climate of global tension, alarmist headlines are tempting, but I would urge the Estonian media to show greater situational awareness and less appetite for drama.
We live in an era where every Estonian must not only have completed basic military training, know their wartime role and be confident that Russia will be beaten, but also understand NATO’s air policing rules and trust what our Defence Forces and allies are doing.
Since 1991, Russian aircraft have regularly flown from bases in the former Leningrad Military District to Kaliningrad and back. In recent years, these flights have often amounted to provocation – skirting borders, flying as far as Sweden before turning back, often without transponders or flight plans.
Since 2014, Russian aircraft have breached Estonia’s airspace more than 40 times, mostly fleeting “corner cuttings” near Vaindloo island, where control zones do not fully match the state boundary. The last serious spell was in 2016, with ten incidents. Even Putin’s own aircraft entered our airspace for 50 seconds in 2018 en route to meet Trump in Helsinki. By contrast, there were no recorded violations in 2023–24.
Friday’s incident, however, was far more serious – for four reasons.
First, duration: not since 2004, on the eve of our NATO accession, have Russians stayed so long in Estonian airspace. Second, geography: unlike Vaindloo, where a slip might be claimed, yesterday’s incursion was brazen. They entered near Loksa and exited, or were forced out, near Hiiumaa. Third, scale: instead of a lone ageing plane, three heavy fighters were involved. Fourth, the wider international context: Russian provocations elsewhere – drones over Poland, incursions into Romanian skies, intensified attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, even a cyberattack on Heathrow – all form a pattern of escalation across Europe. Ironically, this often signals weakness on the battlefield: just yesterday Ukraine liberated at least 160 square kilometres and Russian offensive strength has ebbed in recent weeks.
No cause for panic
Estonia and NATO will now decide how to respond. With luck, we will find both the justification and the backbone to act. But there is no cause for panic. Despite appearances – carefully cultivated by Moscow – this was a cautious infringement. The Russians deviated only slightly from their usual route, left themselves the excuse of a navigational error, carried no visible armaments, and complied when NATO fighters forced them out.
The interception followed a standard pattern. NATO’s rules of engagement are not public, but the principles are well known – including to Russia. NATO avoids any move that might justify escalation, while ensuring violations are contained.
The Baltic Air Policing Mission, run from bases at Ämari and Šiauliai, is on permanent Quick Reaction Alert. Friday’s intercept was directed from NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centre in Uedem, Germany, in coordination with Estonia’s own command centre. Italian F-35s stationed at Ämari were scrambled, identified the intruders first by radar and data link, then visually, attempted radio contact, and finally used internationally recognised manoeuvres to compel their exit. All evidence was recorded for potential diplomatic or legal use.
The escalation ladder is clear: warnings by radio, then visual signals, then physical escort. Lethal force is the absolute last resort, requiring political authorisation, unless pilots face an immediate threat to their lives. In such circumstances, NATO pilots have the right of self-defence.
Ultimately, the decision to use lethal force lies with the government of the nation whose fighters are involved. In this case, Italy retained the authority. Estonia could in theory have ordered the aircraft shot down, but coordinating such an order with our allies in time would have been near impossible. This is an issue that may require clearer agreements in future.
Estonia should have its own fighter capability
For Estonia, there is a bigger strategic choice ahead. I have long argued that we should build our own fighter capability and integrate it with the Nordic air forces. Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark now operate under a single command, with more aircraft than Russia itself.
Sweden’s Gripen programme is well within our reach – even initially by leasing a dozen fighters – and would allow us to grow into a serious air force step by step. Participation in a joint Nordic air structure would bring far greater security benefits than the costs of maintaining such aircraft alone.
On Friday, the Estonian government rightly triggered NATO Article 4 consultations. Given the security climate, Russia’s growing brazenness and the need to reinforce deterrence, this was the proportionate step to take.
Armed force is used only in extremis
For those suddenly turned “air warfare experts,” a reminder: since 2004, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’s skies have been safeguarded by the NATO Baltic Air Policing Mission. It is a peacetime operation, not a warfighting mission. Its purpose is to monitor the skies, identify violations, and guarantee sovereignty. The legal basis lies in the NATO treaty, international law and national legislation. Surveillance is delivered through NATO’s integrated air and missile defence system, backed by radars, AWACS aircraft and command centres.
The rules are simple: fighters are on standby around the clock, ready to launch within minutes. The escalation ladder is designed to control risk: radio, visual ID, visual signals, then escort. Armed force is used only in extremis – in self-defence, or with explicit political authority, and always under the principles of necessity and proportionality.
Every radar trace, every radio exchange, every cockpit recording is preserved. They become the evidence for diplomatic protests, NATO Article 4 or 5 discussions, and legal proceedings.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author.
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